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ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS ON INDIGNATION:
FROM NEMESIS TO THEODICY
Gayne Nerney

The intention of this essay is to examine the accounts of indignation in the
philosophical psychologies of Aristotle and Aquinas, and, in particular,
Aquinas's criticism of Aristotle's evaluation of the ethical significance of this
emotion. It is argued that Aquinas holds the truth concerning the nature of
indignation not to be obtainable on the grounds of theological neutrality. The
reason for this is that the philosophical account of indignation calls for a
forthrightly theistic reflection on the ultimate meaning of this emotion. Thus,
the account of nemesis within philosophical psychology finds its completion
only in theodicy. The paper concludes with a reflection on the criticism that
Aquinas's devaluation of indignation could undercut the emotional basis of
the virtue of justice.

In this essay I would like to consider the accounts of indignation in the
philosophical psychologies of Aristotle and Aquinas. More specifically, I
want to reflect on the implications for theistic ethics of the sharp and surprising disagreement that arises between Aristotle and Thomas regarding the
ethical significance of this passion. While focusing on Aquinas's analysis of
the various species of "sorrow for another's good," where, in the process of
examining the sinfulness of envy, Thomas makes explicit his emphatic dissent from Aristotle's evaluation of the moral status of indignation, 1 I will also
try to engage the hoary topic of the philosophical consequences of religious
commitment. Assuming, at least in the case of "the human things', that understanding and evaluation are indissolubly and reciprocally linked, it would
follow that in this disagreement over the praiseworthiness of indignation-a
seemingly small matter-we might contemplate an important, perhaps profound, difference between Aristotle and Aquinas. It is the thesis of this essay
that reflecting on this difference of opinion confronts us with some of the
surprising consequences religious commitment forces on philosophy and ethics. I will argue that what we see in this dispute is an implicit claim by
Thomas Aquinas that the truth concerning the nature of indignation is not
obtainable on the grounds of theological neutrality, let alone on the grounds
of ethical neutrality. The reason for this, I will try to show, is that the
philosophical account of indignation points toward, and calls for, a forthrightly theistic reflection on the meaning of this emotion in light of man's
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ultimate spiritual vocation. In a phrase, then, I will argue that the account
of nemesis within philosophical psychology finds its completion only in
theodicy.
I. The Place of Indignation in Aristotle's Account of Passionate Life

Aristotle defines indignation (nemesis) as a sorrow or pain felt at the apprehension of undeserved good fortune. 2 He says that indignation is "in one
sense" opposed to pity (eleos), pity being a sorrow or pain felt at the sight
of undeserved misfortune. 3 In another sense, however, these two passions are
not utterly contrary because the capacity for feeling these two species of
sorrow "is due to the same moral qualities," and these moral qualities "are
associated with good moral character. "4 Elaborating on this point, Aristotle
observes that because "whatever is undeserved is unjust," it is "our duty both
to feel sympathy and pity for unmerited distress, and to feel indignation at
unmerited prosperity."5 The man of good moral character is duty bound to
be distressed by the spectacle of injustice. Whether the injustice consists in
a wicked man prospering or in a righteous man suffering does not matter; the
very occurrence of such things ought be felt as morally offensive. Clearly,
for Aristotle, indignation is a passion felt by good men, even though the
experience is in itself painful, just as malice (epichairekakia) is a passion felt
by evil men, even though the experience is in itself pleasant. 6 Indignation,
especially when transformed into a disposition, would seem, therefore, like
malice and envy (phthonos), to be an "extreme" to which the concept of the
mean does not directly apply. This would seem to be the case not withstanding
the fact that later in the Ethics, when he tries, in a rough and ready fashion, to
assimilate these emotions to the schema of the mean, Aristotle speaks of indignation as "the observance of the mean between envy and malice. "7 In any
event, Aquinas is perfectly correct in attributing to Aristotle the view that
to suffer, and to be disposed to suffer indignation "belongs to good morals."8
To these points it must, however, be added that indignation is a passion that
is, as such, good to suffer, if the judgments and beliefs on which the occurrence of this passion depends are accurate, i.e., in accord with right reason. 9
In other words, the judgment or belief that the recipient of the good in
question does not deserve or merit this good must be justified. Also, taking
the other circumstance, the judgment or belief that what the undeserving one
has received is really good must also be reasonable. For example, if the good
that the undeserving one has received is money, it must not be the case that
it is counterfeit. Thus, even those emotions that, according to Aristotle, are
praiseworthy extremes, like indignation and pity, still require the stabilization
of reason in order to be truly virtuous.
Now, in order to believe that the circumstances for righteous indignation
could even arise, one must believe that there are real goods that can accrue
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to the worthy and unworthy alike. For Aristotle and Aquinas the goods of the
soul, or spiritual goods, cannot in principle accrue to the unworthy. Further,
the good that is friendship (philia), even though it is an external good,IO is
also not a good that can accrue to the unworthy; one always has the friends
one deserves. 11 It follows from this that in order to believe that there is such
a thing as virtuous indignation, one must believe that there are non-psychic,
non-spiritual goods, other than friendship, that really are goods. To commend,
then, the passion of indignation implies a commendation of temporal goods,
e.g., health, wealth, and honor, the perception of the unmerited possession of
which is the causa sine qua non of undergoing this emotional reaction.
Aristotle and Aquinas are in perfect agreement concerning the commendation of pity and the censure of envy and malice. They are also in agreement
as to the praiseworthiness of zeal, or emulation (zelos), and as to the importance of distinguishing this passion from envy, with which it is often confused. Zeal, or emulation, is, like indignation and pity, a passion felt by those
of good moral character. While superficially like envy, being a pain felt at
the sight of another's deserved good fortune, the pain of emulation is felt
"not because others have these goods, but because we have not got them
ourselves."12 Zealous pain is self-accusatory; one may feel this pain and at
the same time be gladdened by the success of our rival or friend, gladdened
for him and yet pained by what his success reminds us about our own lack
of accomplishment or unfulfilled promise. Emulation may, thus, spur one to
positive action in the pursuit of excellence. Envy, on the other hand, certainly
does not beget such attempt, tending, rather, to provoke only reactive denigration, if not an endeavour actually to supplant or hinder one's ·competitor'.
Summing up Aristotle's account of indignation, pity, envy, malice and
emulation, we note that there are nine combinations of pain/pleasure, unmerited/merited, and misfortune/good fortune associated with this group of sorrows and joys. With this set of emotions that concern "what is happening to
our neighbor," or what is happening to "those we know, if only they are not
very closely related to US,"13 there are nine instead of eight such combinations
because, as indicated above, PAIN at MERITED GOOD-FORTUNE formally
describes two different emotions, namely, envy and emulation. The following
chart spells out (only) these nine passional possibilities.
1. PAIN at the spectacle of UNMERITED MISFORTUNE is Pity.
2. PAIN at the spectacle of UNMERITED GOOD-FORTUNE is Indignation.
3. PAIN at the spectacle of MERITED MISFORTUNE is Misplaced Pity.
4. PAIN (other-begrudging) at the spectacle of MERITED GOOD-FORTUNE is Envy.

5. PAIN (self-critical) at the spectacle of MERITED GOOD-FORTUNE is
Emulation.
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6. PLEASURE at the spectacle of UNMERITED MISFORTUNE is Malice.
7. PLEASURE at the spectacle of UNMERITED GOOD-FORTUNE is Impious Ingratitude.
8. PLEASURE at the spectacle of MERITED MISFORTUNE is Anger Fulfilled.
9. PLEASURE at the spectacle of MERITED GOOD-FORTUNE is Love
Fulfilled.

For five of the nine possibilities (1,2,4,5,6) the Aristotelian name for the
emotional complex is given by definition. The last two cases (8,9) describe,
respectively, the fulfillment of anger (or, possibly, hatred) and love. 14 Speaking explicitly about case #8, PLEASURE at MERITED MISFORTUNE, Aristotle says, commending this emotional reaction, that "[if] you are pained
by the unmerited distress of others, you will be pleased, or at least not pained,
by their merited distress. Thus no good man can be pained by the punishment
of parricides or murderers."15 Case #9, PLEASURE at MERITED GOODFORTUNE, describes nothing less than the consummation of loving friendship, since, for Aristotle, friendship, or love, involves wishing for our friend
what one believes to be good things, not for our sake but for his.16 For case
#3, PAIN at MERITED MISFORTUNE, an Aristotelian term is not ready to
hand. However, besides his indirect comment about the virtual duty to take
pleasure at the spectacle of deserved punishment, this case describes just the
kind of "morbid sentimentality" or "misplaced pity" that Aristotle believes
tragedy serves to correct. 17 The strange case #7, PLEASURE at UNMERITED
GOOD-FORTUNE, as stated, seems to involve taking pleasure in another
person's undeserved good luck. However, besides making more sense (and
being more interesting), if one thinks of this emotional possibility as the
taking of pleasure at one's own unmerited good fortune, it is possible to find
an Aristotelian explanation for this passion in his remarks on "power." From
this angle, this possibility would describe the situation where one takes pleasure in one's good luck while remaining utterly oblivious to the fact that it
is undeserved. To react in such a fashion is to be utterly without a sense of
gratitude: "[Good fortune] does indeed make men more supercilious and more
reckless; but there is one excellent quality that goes with it-piety, and
respect for the divine power, in which they believe because of events which
are really the result of chance."18 As we will see, this possibility is important
for Aquinas's sketch of how divine grace, not chance, works on the souls of
unworthy but correctable human beings.
Aristotle and Aquinas are in virtual agreement in eight of these nine cases,
with respect both to the characterization of the emotional state in question
and the evaluation of its ethical significance. Where the Philosopher and the
Angelic Doctor part company, where their disagreement is emphatic and
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instructive, is on the issue of the praiseworthiness of indignation. According
to Aquinas, taking his stand on "the teaching of faith," neither the feeling of
indignation nor the disposition to feel indignation is praiseworthy per se. In
fact, it is forbidden for the faithful to indulge this kind of sorrow. Thomas's
comment runs as follows:
Thirdly, one may grieve over another's good, because he who happens to
have that good is unworthy of it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned
by virtuous goods, which make a man just, but, as the Philosopher states, is
about riches, and those things which can accrue to the worthy and the unworthy; and he calls this sorrow nemesis, saying that it belongs to good
morals. But he says this because he considered temporal goods in themselves,
insofar as they may seem great to those who look not to eternal goods; but,
according to the teaching of the faith, temporal goods that accrue to those
who are unworthy are so disposed according to God's just ordering, either
for the correction of those men, or for their condemnation, and such goods
are as nothing in comparison with the goods to come, which are prepared for
good men. Therefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in Holy Writ, according
to Ps. 36. 1: "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy them that work iniquity,"
and elsewhere (Ps. 72. 2, 3): "My steps had well nigh slipped, for I was
envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners."19

What leads Thomas to this view, and what does this disagreement reveal
about the deeper issues separating him and Aristotle? How precisely does a
reflection on the nature of indignation lead into a discussion of the nature of
divine providence? How does understanding the nature of indignation contribute to answering the questions of the perplexed concerning the prosperity
of the wicked?

II. Religious Commitment and Philosophical Truth
One may begin to appreciate the significance of this disagreement by considering the fact that Aquinas does not choose to situate his full treatment of
indignation, emulation, and envy, these "sorrows for another's good," in that
part of the Treatise on the Passions where he deals with the other varieties
of sorrow. Thomas does indeed mark the place where this topic would fit into
the plan of this treatise,20 but he chooses to deal with these subjects in his
discussion of the sin of envy in the Treatise on Faith, Hope, and Charity. Put
simply, Aquinas foregoes considering indignation in the more theoretical
context of the Treatise on the Passions in favor of the more straightforwardly
apologetical context of the Treatise on Faith, Hope, and Charity. For Thomas
it seems that understanding passions like indignation and envy leads one into
the heart of the religious life, or that this is one of those subjects where the
philosophical truth can be grasped only by taking a religious stand. Let me
attempt to clarify this rather controversial statement.
In this passage of the Summa where indignation is discussed, Aquinas takes
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a stand on "the teaching of the faith." This raises immediately two issues. In
the first place, this taking of a religious stand in the process of determining
the ethical status of indignation seems to confront us with the spectacle of
Thomas "confusing" the philosophical and theological orders.21 If it is
Thomas's intention to state the truth about the moral meaning of indignation,
it would seem, prima facie, as illegitimate to rest such a claim on some (more
or less) specific religious premise (i.e., a premise not de facto universaIly
held) as it would be to make such a claim on the basis of a partisan political
commitment. And yet, as Gilson reminds us in his account of the Thomistic
view of the relationship between faith and reason, "it is impossible to pretend
that a mind of [Thomas's] temper is not fully conscious of its aim,"22 especiaIly on this issue. If, then, this "confusion" is merely apparent, would it not
foIlow that in this passage Thomas means to imply that the philosophical
truth concerning indignation can be grasped only by an appeal to "the teaching of the faith"? In other words, and assuming for the moment that "the
faith" in question is the Christian faith, could it not be that Thomas considers
the historical fact of Christianity to have philosophical consequences, which
it would be impermissible for the philosopher to ignore, not merely for the
sake of historical accuracy, but for the sake of philosophical truth itself?23 Is
this one of the places in the Summa where we see Thomas-the Common
Doctor-making the implicit claim that "through the Christian 'revelation'
of grace as the experienced intrusion of transcendence unto human life"
philosophy has attained the highest level of "differentiated knowledge" yet?24
If this conjecture is plausible-and I have framed it as a question to underscore the fact that it is a conjecture-Thomas would not simply be arguing
ex cathedra in his discussion of indignation; he would be taking his stand on
Christian philosophy, and not simply on Christian religious doctrine. Granting such a conjecture, there would be here no "confusion" of philosophical
and theological orders, but rather an implicit claim that there are somefactual
conditions conducive, perhaps even necessary, to the discovery of timeless
truth, and that among these are the philosophical implications of Christianity.
In sum, and to make the paradox clear, granting this conjecture, we would
have an implicit claim that an intellectual orientation grounded in a faith
whose proper articles are beyond reason is, nonetheless, the stance from
which can be discovered the philosophical truth about this aspect of human
nature, viz. the ultimate meaning of the passion of indignation.
Let me now briefly address the second question raised by Thomas's procedure in this passage. In spinning out the interpretive conjecture articulated
above, I suggested we assume that "the faith" mentioned by Thomas is the
Christian faith. Now, I personaIly have little doubt that whenever Thomas
speaks of "the faith" without qualifications, he means the one, universal,
Christian faith. When we inspect, however, the biblical references in
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Thomas's text, we see that they all refer to what Christians call the 'Old
Testament'. In other words, it seems that the theological premises needed to
grasp the truth about indignation are not specifically Christian; Aquinas's
specific biblical references carry the implication that "the faith" in question
could be either Christianity or Judaism. It is, then, an orientation in terms of
a commitment to some form of theism that apparently offers the superior
philosophical standpoint on this issue. 2s Further, since, as we will see below,
the theologem in question concerns nothing more (or less!) than the general
strategy by which a religion deals with the theodicy problem generated by
the apparent worldly prosperity of the wicked (simply using the word,
'apparent', in this connection is the key aspect of such a strategy), it would
seem that "the faith" relevant to this issue could be Islam or (theistic) Hinduism, as wel1 as Christianity or Judaism. 26

III. The Theodicy of Nemesis
Turning now to Aquinas's account of indignation, we recall that Aristotle
and Aquinas agree that those things unequivocally good-the goods of the
soul or spiritual goods-cannot in principle be possessed by the unworthy.
Aquinas goes on, however, to say that when a temporal good accrues to
someone unworthy, the pious soul will not feel sorrow at this unworthy'S
undeserved good fortune. According to Aquinas, the believer will perceive
this situation as indicating either of two alternative possibilities, both of
which are, in some sense, 'happy', or, if painful, then certainly not painful
in the sense of being "sorrow for another's good."
The first alternative describes the situation in which the perception of an
unmerited 'reward' will (and ought) be taken by the theist as a divinely
ordered device for the correction of the unworthy one. Now, the unworthy
are such because of, among other things, their lack of concern for spiritual
goods, or their oblivion as to the very distinction between spiritual and temporal goods, a distinction they tend to acknowledge only 'notionally,' if at
all. Thus, if they are to be corrected by an intrusion of transcendence into
their lives, the unworthy must be addressed at their own level, namely, at the
vulgar level of temporal goods. In this situation it is possible for an unworthy
but correctable man to acknowledge, while thanking fortune, that he does
not deserve the 'good' that has accrued to him. Thanking 'his lucky stars',
this person may shift his attention away from the ostensible good that has
come his way, away, that is, from the pleasure that the possession of such a
'good' habitual1y prompts in him, and toward the fact of his unworthiness,
toward, that is, his existential condition of gUilt. Gratitude for good luck, and
an inchoate sense of guilt, may be transformed into gratitude for divine
providence and prayer for God to make him worthy. An unworthy but correctable man may, thus, respond to his undeserved good luck by blushing at
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his unmerited prosperity, and, realizing his spiritual poverty, might exert
himself to seek the kingdom of heaven. 27 Even on the presumption of predestination, it is only on the basis of such an exertion that a man might become
such as could receive divine grace, i.e., only on the basis of such a 'work'
could he become 'matter' made ready for the superimposition of a forma
spiritualis upon his forma naturalis. 28 In sum, according to Aquinas, the
theist's soul feels anything but pain for his 'neighbor' on such an occasion.
He, in fact, feels pleasure, perhaps even something approaching the love of
soon-to-be-possible friendship.
The second alternative will (and ought) be the perception by the pious soul
of this situation-a situation in which an unworthy ostensibly reaps a goodas a divinely ordered device for the condemnation or punishment of the
unworthy one. Precisely because such an unworthy one, by hypothesis unworthy and uncorrectable, will not regard the unmerited fulfillment of his
appetite for temporal goods as a 'punishment' or even as a 'temptation,' it
follows that what he takes to be his 'good luck' is in reality a curse that
sediments him in his sinful oblivion and vicious habits. This will be the case
even if he thinks just the opposite, and laughs scornfully at the very thought
that matters might be otherwise. The believer's soul will not, then, perceive
such a situation as one of unmerited good fortune, but rather as one of merited
misfortune, i.e., as an act of divine justice, fittingly laced with irony. This is
a situation which, in one sense, gladdens the pious men-the sinner is, after
all, punished-but which, in another sense, saddens him-it is a sorrowful
thing to see a soul fall. The believer here might, following the example of
Abraham, attempt to bargain with God for the soul of even this unworthy
one; he might persist in the hope, against hope, that even such an apparently
uncorrectable unworthy might eventually be corrected by God's paradoxical
punishment, even if only at death's door. In such situations the pious man
may grasp in awe, or righteous fear, the gravity of the divine gift of freedom
as he trembles before the very thought of a Being capable of such love-the
love involved in granting a freedom of which it is foreknown that it will be
grievously abused.

IV. Indignation and the Pursuit of Justice
This discussion of indignation, which is 'footnote' to Aquinas's discussion
of the various species of sorrow, supplies a concrete explication of what Jews
and Christians mean when they speak of divine intervention into nature, or
of the transformation of human nature by grace. If 'nature' is a source or
principle of movement in that to which it primarily belongs,29 and if passion
is itself a movement of the sensitive appetite,30 then if the capacity for a
passion is changed, that thing's capacity for movement as such has been
changed. If this is so, then the very nature of that thing has been changed.
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The believer's soul should not, according to Aquinas, have the capacity for
indignation. The natural form of such a man would have been altered by the
superimposition of a spiritual form, which graciously frees such a man from
this species of sorrow, granting him others instead. In sum, the theodicy of
nemesis sketched above has the clear implication that a Christian simply
ought not (and will not, if blessed) feel pain at the unmerited good fortune
of the unworthy.
Even though my own pose up to this point has been simply that of a
philosophically interested reporter, it is difficult to suppress a question as to
the plausibility of this view (or of my reading of Thomas's views). I raise,
thus, this question of truth both for its own sake and for the sake of my
interpretation. One wonders, quite frankly, whether or not such a proposed
reformation of the human soul would not, in effect, undercut the virtue of
justice. To put the point baldly, does not this sublime denigration of indignation suggest something of an escape into an a-political other worldliness that
would (like a-political cynicism on the other extreme), in effect, cooperate
in the delivery of the world over to the forces of evil and injustice? Is not
the piety engendered by such a sublime denigration of indignation in reality
a despairing of man and his world?3l
What we are asking here is whether the passion of indignation is not one
of the necessary (albeit not sufficient) ingredients of an authentic concern for
justice, both distributive and commutative justice, even where the latter is
conceived as "fraternal correction." One need not, in this connection, argue,
in vulgar Marxist fashion that the 'sense of justice' is just another name for
the passion of indignation. 32 No, the point is quite simply whether in the order
of the passions themselves, or, more precisely, in that ready-for-action order
constituted by the virtuous alliance of reason and passion, the diminution or
eradication of that sorrow called 'indignation' would not effectively subvert
the will to justice.
In my opinion the .answer to all of these serious questions is simply, No.
H should be obvious that the brand of Christianity articulated and defended
by Saint Thomas Aquinas, while no doubt taking its lead from the vision of
eternal goods and not from the beacon of politics, is in no way prepared to
surrender man and his world to the forces of evil and injustice. The reason
that this commitment is compatible with his religiously motivated transvalution of indignation is that this passion, this species of sorrow for another's
(putative) good is not a necessary (let alone a sufficient) condition of an
unfeigned love of justice. In the order of the passions as conceived by
Aquinas, besides the love of justice and the hatred of injustice (and the desire
for the one and the aversion for the other), the passions perhaps necessary to
the endeavour for justice are fear, pity and (perhaps above all) anger. Not
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only is indignation not necessary, it may, in fact, be an actual stumbling block
to the pursuit of justice.
In order to appreciate the surprising irrelevance of indignation to the virtuous aspiration for justice, we should take a closer look at the circumstances
that could lead one to think that this passion really figures in this pursuit.
This situation, we remember, is one in which an unworthy has apparently
gained a good that he does not deserve. Further, and in order to characterize
the situation so that it will clearly bear on the issue of justice, we should also
assume that our unworthy one has reaped this undeserved good by means of
an unjust act; the (putative) good in question is undeserved precisely because
it has been obtained by foul means. Thus, we will assume that the unworthy's
possession of this unmerited good is not just a matter of dumb luck.
Now, as Thomas points out, one of the sorrowful reactions to such a state
of affairs is simply an effect of fear-namely, the fear that the unworthy's
prosperity may threaten to be an occasion of harm to oneself and/or one's
friends. This sorrowful reaction to an enemy's prosperity is, according to
Thomas, .often confused with envy, zeal and indignation. 33 To be sure, this
fearful sorrow can arise even if the enemy unworthy's prosperity is simply
due to luck. But the kind of fearful sorrow in question here will be all the
more reasonable and understandable if the unworthy's threatening prosperity
is the result of vicious action. Certainly, the prima facie justice of a preemptive attack that might be provoked by such a fear would be all the more
credible if the unworthy one's prosperity were the result of a known disposition to unjust action. 34
To the extent that responses to such fearful sorrow are manifestations of
the pursuit of justice (qua avoidance of suffering injustice), it is obvious that
indignation is irrelevant. In fact, the focus of the appetite is here on thefuture
evils that may be suffered by oneself and/or one's friends at the hand of the
'lucky' unworthy, and not on the undeserved good possessed by the unworthy. One wonders whether an appetite focusing on the good-unworthily-possessed (rather than on the future evils that may-will be done) would even
prompt the useful, just and (perhaps) noble act of preemptive attack, or
'retaliation before the fact.'
The circumstances that can provoke indignation or the more useful passion
of fearful sorrow can also occasion other emotional reactions. If, for example,
the undeserved good has been acquired by the commission of a vicious act,
then it is possible to notice as a major component of this scene the person or
persons whose undeserved suffering have provided our unworthy with his
'goods.' Both Aristotle and Aquinas agree that it is one of the marks of a
man of good moral character to feel pity for the victim of undeserved misfortune, whether this misfortune be the result of undeserved bad luck or of
an unjust act. We ask, following Aquinas, if it is not much more commendable
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to feel pity for the victim of injustice than to indulge one's soul in a fit of
indignation. Is it not more praiseworthy to permit oneself to feel the pain of
undeserved misfortune as if it were one's own than to let oneself sorrowfully
focus on the good-unworthily-possessed?
In any event, the passion of pity, like fearful sorrow, may suffice to prompt
the pursuit of justice, especially that species of commutative (or redistributi ve) justice called "fraternal correction." On the basis of the Christian maxim
that one is obliged to "hate not our neighbor's nature, but his fault," Aquinas
goes so far as to say that one ought to act in such circumstances precisely so
that "our reproof may be the outcome not of hatred, but of pity. "35 Clearly
indignation has no place in such an attitude.
But let us return to our consideration of the manner in which pity may
prompt the pursuit of justice. In the view of both Aristotle and Aquinas, the
man of good moral character cares about others, whether this care arises from
family ties, friendship, business or political association, or merely "because
of the nature [he has] in common" with them. 36 Because the man of good
moral character is obviously not a selfish man, it is not only possible but
almost certain that the pity he feels for the sufferers of injustice will provoke
anger directed at the evildoer who has brought about such unmerited misfortuneY Here we must note that neither Thomas's acceptance of the traditional
inclusion of anger among the capital sins, nor his acknowledgement that the
passion of anger is not perfectly rational, is inconsistent with his quite emphatic stress on the positive role of anger in moral life. 38 It is the act of anger
wherein the sense appetite is arrayed in word and deed against the eternal
law, ignoring "the command of reason" and obstructing the path of virtue,
that is the "sin of anger," and thus "fittingly" included among the capital
sins. 39 Neither the act of anger per se nor the passion of anger is sinful as
such. Quite to the contrary, not only is the passion of anger "in a manner,"
natural to man, but it also presupposes both the respectful conviction that the
doers of injustice are men, i.e., free agents who can, and ought, be held
responsible for their actions, and a social sense of belonging to a moral
community that deserves loving loyaJty.4o As Thomas says, given that anger
"denotes application of good to evil," it follows that "to wish evil to someone
under the aspect of justice may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be
in conformity with the command of reason. "41 Of particular interest on this
score is the following passage from Thomas's commentary on Aristotle's
Ethics:
Anger is a desire for vengeance. Hence one who is not angry at the things
he should, accordingly does not punish the actions he ought to punish. This
is blameworthy. However, this explanation is not to be understood as if
another vengeance cannot be taken according to the judgment of reason
without anger, but as if the movement of anger stirred up by the judgment
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of reason makes one more prompt to take vengence in the right way. If the
sensitive appetite did not help to carry out the judgment of reason, it would
be useless in human nature. 42

While it may be of moral worth to seek justice merely from the passion of
anger,43 Aquinas believes, as the passage quoted above indicates, that justice
can be pursued simply on the basis of reason and will. Characterizing the
truly virtuous individual, he says of such a person that "a man, by the judgment of his reason [may choose] to be affected by a passion in order to work
more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. "44 It is the very
telos of human moral development that reason and passion be brought into
such a symbiotic relationship.
No passion, let alone indignation, is, thus, a necessary ingredient of the
pursuit of justice. This is so even though it is also true that human nature has
been so framed that passion may be in perfect harmony with reason, passion
serving reason as its consummate helpmate. Action in the name and spirit of
justice may be built on, and is in fact fortified by, the passions of fear, pity
and anger. In all three instances it is the unworthy as doer or potential doer
of (other) evil acts, and not the unworthy as possessor of a putative good,
that is the focus of the sensitive appetite. Clearly indignation is not necessary
for the pursuit of justice; the soul purged of indignation is not a soul eviscerated of its capacity for seeking this arduous good. Indeed, the Thomistic
account of the ethical status of indignation, which at first glance could appear
as sheer "foolishness" to "the wisdom of the world," appears on reflection to
offer another proof of the hard saying that idealism is (ultimately) the surest
form of practicality. Perhaps it is only after being freed from indignation by
a divine, soul-transforming grace that the pursuit of justice and the higher
goods can truly commence. It is in this light, then, that we should understand
Thomas's criticism of Aristotle's view of the ethical status of indignation.
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